We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale rms and a myriad of small-scale rms may give rise to dierent types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we nd conditions under which the free entry and exit of small rms incentivizes big rms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, behaving as if in monopolistic competition. We call this result the dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specic market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
Introduction
According to Bruce D. Henderson, the founder of the Boston Consulting Group, a stable competitive market never has more than three signicant competitors. Using a sample of more than 160 U.S. industries, two base-time periods, and numerous performance measures, Uslay et al. (2010) nd that most industries consist of three large generalists and numerous small and specialized producers, which succeed if they are able to operate in a niche market. However controversial the so-called Rule of Three may be, it seems unquestionable that many industries are dominated by a handful of big rms, which share the market with many small rms. Using a sample of 50, 000 U.S. rms, Hottman et al. (2016) observe that almost 90 percent of sales in a product group are produced by the 10 largest rms, while 98 percent of rms have market shares smaller than 2 percent. Similarly, the empirical trade literature documents the fact that a handful of rms account for a considerably large share of exports in many countries (Bernard et al., 2012) .
In this paper, we develop a simple, new theory which captures the interactions between big and small rms and fully characterizes the market outcome. The key idea is to combine two kinds of rms: a discrete number of atomic players, which represent big rms, and a continuum of nonatomic players, which represent small rms. Our setting thus blends oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive rms, which all produce dierent varieties of the same dierentiated product. Formally, a big rm supplies a positive mass of varieties, whereas a small rm supplies a single variety. Owing to the dierence in their product scope, rms adopt dierent attitudes toward competition: the big rms understand that they can strategically manipulate the market, whereas the small rms, which are each negligible to the market, treat the market conditions as given and choose their outputs (or prices) accordingly. Big and small rms dier here in kind because the latter are negligible to the market, while the former are not. This is to be contrasted with Melitz (2003) where the so-called big and small rms dier in types but not in kind because they are all negligible to the market (Neary, 2010 ).
In the wake of general-equilibrium models with imperfect competition (Hart, 1985) and the StackelbergSpence-Dixit literature on entry deterrence (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1979) , we assume that big rms are aware that their choices aect the size of the competitive fringe. More specically, the market process is described as a two-stage game. At the rst stage, a big rm chooses its outputs (or prices), anticipating the reactions of the small rms. At the second stage, the small businesses choose their outputs (or prices), treating the big rm's choice parametrically. In other words, the small rms enter or exit the market, whereas the big rms always stay in business. The same setting is used in the dominant rm model where one big rm chooses its sale price while anticipating the reactions of a large number of small rms which treat this price as a given (Markham, 1951) . Note, however, the dierence between this model, where the mass of small rms is exogenous, and ours, where it is endogenous. We discuss the staging of the game further in Section 2.
Our main nding is an eect new to the literature, which we christen the dilution of market power.
The essence of this eect is that, despite being endowed with the ability to strategically manipulate the market, a large rm may nd it rational to disregard this ability and mimic the behavior of small rms.
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In other words, the large rms adopt the same aggressive pricing rule as the one followed by the rms belonging to the monopolistically competitive rms.
2 Therefore, the market structure is observationally equivalent to monopolistic competition.
We illustrate this eect by considering an economy where consumers have linear-quadratic preferences, while the supply side involves one large incumbent and a monopolistically competitive fringe. Whenever the equilibrium market structure is hybrid, i.e. it involves rms of both kinds, the dilution of the big rm's market power always occurs. But why is this so? Although the incumbent can manipulate the total output available on the market through its own output, it understands that the mass of small rms varies so that the equilibrium aggregate output is the same regardless of its own behavior. In other words, the fringe acts as a buer that stabilizes competition. We will see that a necessary and sucient condition for this to happen is that the big rm is not too big relative to the market. Otherwise, the incumbent chooses to either deter or blockade entry, as in Dixit (1979) .
Next, we show that the dilution of market power keeps its relevance far beyond this simple example.
The key-factor is that the demands faced by rms are single-aggregate, i.e. all the cross-eects in the demand system are captured by a scalar function whose value plays the role of a market aggregate (Pollak, 1972 ). This condition is satised for a broad class of demand systems, including those generated by additive preferences (Zhelobodko et al., 2012) , indirectly additive preferences (Bertoletti and Etro, 2017) , and homothetic demand systems with a single aggregator (Matsuyama and Ushchev, 2017) . We show that, when the market involves several big rms, all rms are heterogeneous and demands are single-aggregate, then any hybrid market outcome displays the dilution of market power. This is because the equilibrium market aggregate pinned down by free entry is independent of the big rms' choices. As a consequence, 1 The dilution of market power has a strong contestability avor. Indeed, the entry of small rms, which act non-strategically, suces to discipline the big rm since this one chooses to sell its output as the small rms do. What is surprising (at least to us) is the fact that adopting such an aggressive behavior is rational on the part of the big rm. Note, however, the dierence with Baumol (1980) and successors. The threat of entry per se is not sucient here to make the market more competitive. It is the turnover of small rms that incentivizes the incumbent to behave as competitively as the small rms. Another major dierence is that the key factor lies in the nature of preferences, rather than in cost considerations. 2 By pricing rule we mean here an operator which maps the demand schedule faced by a rm into the prot-maximizing price as a function of the rm's marginal cost. Therefore, the same pricing rule does not mean that rms sell at the same price and share the same markups, as the big and small rms are likely to have dierent marginal costs. both kinds of rms treat the market aggregate parametrically, but they do so for very dierent reasons: the small rms are by nature non-strategic, while the big rms accurately anticipate that the small rm's best response is at in the domain of accommodated entry.
The dilution of market power also has a number of far-reaching implications. One such implication is the consequences of idiosyncratic technological shocks to large rms. Specically, if a large rm is subject to, say, an exogenous productivity improvement, the equilibrium behavior of the other big rms remains the same. Another implication is that neither the emergence of new big rms nor the merger of a few of them give rise to major changes economy-wide. All these shocks only aect the size of the monopolistically competitive fringe, without causing any changes in the prot-maximizing strategies chosen by the rms in the fringe.
In contrast, the dilution of market power does not generally occur when the demand system involves two or several aggregates, as under quadratic preferences without an outside good (Demidova, 2017 ) and under homothetic preferences described by Kimball's (1995) exible aggregator. In this case, big rms behave strategically. However, if we consider the possibility of multiple fringes (which may be interpreted, e.g., as populations of rms providing dierent quality levels), the dilution of market power is restored when the number of aggregates equals the number of fringes.
In short, our setting allows for an endogenous determination of market structure. Depending on the market size and the preference for diversity, there is either oligopolistic or monopolistic competition.
Related literature. The foregoing discussion shows that our paper is related to dierent strands of literature, including industrial organization, trade theory and general equilibrium under imperfect competition. In what follows, we discuss the most relevant contributions. It was shown in the 1970s that, when large traders are similar to each other, or when for each large trader there are small traders similar to it, the core of an exchange economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations. In other words, the market power of big traders is diluted (see Gabszewicz and Shitovitz, 1992 , for a survey). Our results have a similar avor. However, as suggested by Okuno et al. (1980) , it is more natural to study such issues in (2014) . Although these authors use dierent approaches to model multi-product rms, they all assume that each rm is negligible to the market. We dier from all of them in that multi-product rms are able to manipulate the market. By showing that these rms may choose not to manipulate the market, we identify conditions for these various models to provide an accurate description of the functioning of markets. Etro (2006 Etro ( , 2008 ) models the idea of big and small rms by assuming that a rm is big when it is the leader of a Stackelberg game and a rm is small when it is a follower. Hence, small rms are also able to manipulate the market outcome. Etro (2008) shows that the leaders are more aggressive than the followers when only big rms are free to enter the market in the second stage of the game. This dierence in results is because, in our setting, the followers pursue the aggressive strategy of pricing at average cost. Therefore, the leaders cannot adopt a more aggressive behavior than the followers. Neary (2010) suggests a dierent approach in which rms choose to be big or small. Instead, we assume that rms are born big or small, but our results show that, under some conditions, the dierences in kind is immaterial for the equilibrium outcome. Our paper is more directly linked to Shimomura and Thisse (2012) and Parenti (2017) . Even though the dilution does not hold in their simultaneous game, these authors show that the presence of small rms incentivize the big rms to behave more aggressively than in a purely oligopolistic environment. This points to the same direction as the dilution of market power.
Even closer to us is the approach developed by Anderson et al. (2015) . The great merit of this paper is to link together results that are a priori disparate. Once oligopolistic rms have chosen to enter the market, their prots depend on their own action and an aggregate of all other rms' actions. Therefore, each rm wants to manipulate the market aggregate, so that the dilution of market power never holds.
Rather, we are interested in studying the impact of a monopolistically competitive fringe on the market outcome. Furthermore, unlike Anderson et al. (2015) , we do not impose restrictions on the functional form of the aggregate, which is given here by any function mapping rms' strategies into a scalar. Finally, our analysis is not restricted to the case of a single aggregate. We show that the dilution of market power holds true when the number of aggregates and fringes is the same. For all these reasons, the two papers are to be viewed as complements rather than substitutes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The aim of Section 2 is to highlight the eect we call the dilution of market power. To achieve this, we use a simple dominant-rm-type model with linear-quadratic preferences, one big rm and a monopolistically competitive fringe. Section 3 provides a general setting with single-aggregate preferences, which claries how far we can go with this result. Section 4 discusses the cases of multiple aggregates and multiple fringes. Section 5 concludes.
The dominant-rm model revisited
The economy involves two goods -a horizontally dierentiated good and a homogenous good -and one production factor -labor. Each consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The labor market is perfectly competitive and labor is chosen as the numéraire.
As discussed in the introduction, our aim is to study a hybrid market structure involving big and small rms characterized by dierent market behaviors: a big rm can manipulate the market aggregate that aects prots, whereas a large number of small rms are unable to inuence this aggregate. The small rms react to the big rm's behavior by choosing to enter/exit the market as well as their output volume once they are in business. This dictates the following modeling strategy: the supply side of the economy involves (i) a continuum of mass M of single-product rms and (ii) one multi-product rm that supplies a given range [0, n] of varieties. We refer to n > 0 as the scope of the big rm and to the set of small rms as the monopolistically competitive fringe. While M is endogenous, we treat n as exogenous to insulate the pure impact of the big rm's scope on the equilibrium market structure. For example, we do not have to make any assumption about cannibalization eects. However, we will discuss at the end of this section what happens when n is endogenous. 
where
is the total consumption (or total output since there is a unit mass of consumers) of the dierentiated good,
Z the consumption of a homogeneous good which is chosen as the numéraire, x i the consumption of the variety provided by the small rm i ∈ [0, M ], and X k is the consumption of the variety k ∈ [0, n] provided by the large rm. The interaction across varieties is captured by X 2 . To ease the burden of notation, the coecient of X in (1) is normalized to 1 by factorizing this coecient, while the coecient of X 2 is also normalized to 1 by choosing appropriately the unit of the dierentiated good. Hence, a lower value of β means a weaker love for variety, a larger market size, or both.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor and an equal ownership share of all rms. She maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint:
where p i denotes the price of variety i and P k the price of variety k, while y > 0 is consumer's income.
Inverse demands and prots. First-order conditions for utility maximization yield the following inverse demand functions for each variety i ∈ [0, M ] and each variety k ∈ [0, n]:
For simplicity, we assume in this section that all marginal costs to zero and denote by f > 0 a small rm's xed cost. Therefore, rm i's prots are given by
Note that we have normalized the market size to 1. If the market size were given by L, the xed cost f would be replaced with f /L in the analysis developed below. Therefore, a larger market is equivalent to a lower xed cost f , which facilitates the entry of small rms.
The big rm's prots are given by
is the big rm's production prole.
Since it is negligible to the market, small rm accurately treats the total output X as a parameter.
By contrast, (2) shows that the big rm expects its action to aect the value of X through its total output X mp dened as follows:
The timing of the game is as follows. The incumbent moves rst and the monopolistically competitive rms second. Besides the reasons discussed in the introduction, this staging may be justied on the following grounds. First, the dierence in entry behavior ts a fairly robust empirical fact, i.e. the survival probability of a rm is positively correlated with its size. Second, the above staging captures the idea that the big rm is committed to the market due to the large investment this rm has to make to build its production capacity. By contrast, the assumption of free entry and exit reects the high turnover characterizing small rms in many industries, probably because these rms invest little money to be in business. We seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game by backward induction.
Stage 2:
The small rms' equilibrium strategies
Assume that a hybrid market structure prevails in equilibrium. In this case, a small rm observes the choice made by the big rm through the total output X mp and chooses its prot-maximizing output. This yields the equilibrium output, price and prots as a function of X:
It is readily veried that the zero-prot condition π * (X) = 0 implies that equilibrium total output is a constant equal to
For X D > 0, we assume that β < 1/(4f ); otherwise, the small rms never enter because f is too high.
In this case, the equilibrium total output is independent of the big rm's behavior: it depends only upon the parameter β, which captures the intensity of preference for diversity, and the small rms' xed cost f , which determines the easiness of entry into the fringe. Note also that X * is independent of the scope n of the big rm.
Substituting X * into x * (X) and p * (X), we determine the small rm's equilibrium output and its equilibrium price:
Therefore, small rms' equilibrium price and output are independent of the big rm's choice, which implies that the big rm inuences the monopolistically competitive fringe through the mass of small rms only. In addition, the zero-prot condition implies that the small rms price their varieties at their average
Evaluating (2) at a symmetric outcome yields X = X mp + M x. Solving for M , we obtain the equilibrium mass of small rms conditional upon X mp :
This expression shows that the fringe acts as a buer that stabilizes the total output at the value X * through a change in the equilibrium mass of small rms. When the big rm increases (decreases) its total output X mp , the size of the fringe shrinks (expands).
Observe that X mp = X D is the unique solution to the equation M * (X mp ) = 0. Therefore, the monopolistically competitive fringe disappears when X mp is suciently large:
which implies that X D is the big rm's minimal total output that deters the entry of small rms. As a result, we have:
As shown by Figure 1 , the behavior of the big rm aects the equilibrium value of the market aggregate if and only if X mp exceeds X D . Otherwise, the big rm behaves as if it had no market power.
Indeed, this rm nds it rational to forego manipulating the equilibrium value of the market aggregate X by changing its total output X mp .
Insert Figure 1 about here Thus, although the big rm is non-negligible to the market, things work as if it were so. As a consequence, any hybrid outcome in which the equilibrium level X * mp of the big rm's output is such that X * mp < X D , is observationally equivalent to a purely monopolistically competitive equilibrium obtained by replacing the big rm with a mass n of small rms. We call this eect dilution of market power and discuss it in more detail in sub-section 2.4.
Stage 1: The large rm's equilibrium strategy
The big rm chooses its output anticipating the small rms' optimal responses. As a result, the big rm treats X * as a given. Thus, the big rm's adjusted inverse demand for each its variety k, with or without a monopolistically competitive fringe, is dened by the following expression:
Combining (9) with (8), the big rm's prot function N(X) may be written as follows:
It follows immediately from (10) that the big rm's prot function is the minimum of two strictly quasi-concave functions, which implies that N(X) is also strictly quasi-concave. Furthermore, as the prot function (10) is symmetric in X, we can focus on symmetric production proles only: X k = X mp /n for all k ∈ [0, n]. Indeed, for each asymmetric production prole X there exists a symmetric prole X with the same level of aggregate output X mp as X such that N(X) < N(X ).
Let Π(X mp ) be the restriction of N(X) to the diagonal, which depends only on the aggregate X mp :
The function Π is the lower envelope of Π 1 and Π 2 , and the equilibrium value of X mp is the maximizer of Π(X mp ). This maximizer exists and is unique because Π(X mp ) is continuous and strictly concave (see Figure 2 ).
The market equilibrium
We are now equipped to provide a full characterization of the equilibrium market structure.
Proposition 1. Assume linear-quadratic preferences. (i) Entry is blockaded if and only if the scope
of the incumbent is suciently broad:
(ii) Entry is deterred if and only if the scope of the incumbent is neither too broad nor too narrow:
(iii) Entry is accommodated if and only if the scope of the incumbent is suciently narrow:
Hence, like in Dixit (1979) , the following cases may arise: the entry of small rms is (i) blockaded, (ii) deterred, or (iii) accommodated by the incumbent. Dixit shows that the strategy chosen by the incumbent depends on the entry cost of the potential entrant relative to the market size. Proposition 1 shows under which conditions on the big rm's size each of these regimes emerges when entrants are small. The main distinctive feature of our approach lies in the endogenous entry and exit of small rms, a dierence that has unsuspected (at least to us) implications.
The proof of Proposition 1 goes as follows. Observe that Π(X mp ) is the lower envelope of two concave parabolas, while Π 1 (X mp ) and Π 2 (X mp ) satisfy the following properties:
. As illustrated by Figure 2 , three cases may arise.
Insert Figure 2 about here Blockaded entry. Assume that Figure 2a) . Since Π 1 (X mp ) and Π 2 (X mp )
are both increasing in the neighborhood of X D , the maximizer of Π(X mp ) exceeds X D , which implies that the big rm is an unconstrained monopolist. It is readily veried that Π 2 (X D ) > 0 holds if and only if the incumbent rm's scope is given by (11).
Since Π 2 (X mp ) is strictly concave, the big rm's prot-maximizing output and prots are obtained from the rst-order-condition:
.
In short, if the incumbent is large enough, entry is suciently costly, or both, then the monopolist may accurately ignore the potential entry of small rms. Otherwise, entry can never be blockaded because the market size is too large for the big rm to ignore the small rms. In this case, does the incumbent deter or accommodate entry?
Entry deterrence. Assume now that Figure 2b) . In this case, the maximizer X * mp of Π(X mp ) is exactly the kink X D . Indeed, the incumbent chooses an output preventing the entry of small rms if and only if X * mp ≥ X D , which is equivalent to M * (X * mp ) = 0. The inequalities
hold if and only if the breadth of the big rm's scope is given by (12) .
Since X D is the smallest value of X that deters entry, it has the nature of a limit output, which is the quantity counterpart of limit pricing. Under entry deterrence, the incumbent's total output and prots are equal to Figure 2c) . Since Π 1 (X mp ) and Π 2 (X mp ) are both decre0asing in X mp in the neighborhood of X D , so does Π(X mp ). Therefore, the maximizer of Π(X mp ) is smaller than X D . This occurs if and only if the big rm's scope n is small enough relative to the market size and given by (13) . Maximizing Π 1 (X mp ) with respect to X mp yields:
To sum up, as n steadily decreases, the incumbent's prots and markups (weakly) decrease, thus implying that the big rm's market power fades away. During this process, the market outcome displays a gradual transition from pure monopoly to monopolistic competition through entry deterrence. Note that the same holds when the market size steadily rises while n remains constant. Since accommodated entry leads to new and unsuspected results, we focus below on the case of hybrid markets.
The dilution of market power
When entry is accommodated, the incumbent faces an inverse demand for variety k that accounts for the mass M * (X mp ) of small rms that enter the market in the second stage. Although the incumbent is a priori able to manipulate X through X mp , it anticipates that the mass (7) of small rms will adjust in a way such that the equilibrium value of X is always equal to X * regardless of the value taken by X mp . In other words, the incumbent accurately treats X * as a parameter.
Plugging (5) into (9), it is straightforward to show that the prot-maximizing output and price of variety k under accommodating entry are given by
which are the same as those given by (6) , that is, the equilibrium output and price of a small rm. Therefore, the big rm's equilibrium total output is X * mp = nx * , while its equilibrium prots are Π * (n) = nf .
Stated dierently, when the large rm accommodates the presence of small rms, the former chooses to sell the quantity x * given by (6) for each of its varieties, which it prices at the same level as the varieties sold by the latter. In other words, if the incumbent is not too big relative to the market, there is monopolistic competition. In other words, the big rm's market power is dissolved in an ocean of small rms.
This amounts to saying that the incumbent behaves like a multidivisional rm in which autonomous prot centers produce each a specic variety and maximize their own prots, while ignoring demand linkages within the rm's product range. While the divisionalization of a rm is often justied by the desire to prevent pyramiding management costs, our model provides a justication driven by the demand side only.
This shows that a rm able to manipulate the market may nd it prot-maximizing to disregard its strategic power, an eect which we christen the dilution of market power. The above example and the analysis developed in the next section show that the dilution of market power owns nothing to the cost side; it is fully driven by the structure of the demand size. Note also that the empirical evidence suggests that the small rms may be signicant in number, while their market share is very small. However, the size of the monopolistically competitive fringe is immaterial for the dilution of market power to hold. What matters is the existence of entry and exit ows in the fringe.
Endogenizing the big rm's product range
So far, we have assumed that the size n of the product range was given. In line with Spulber (1981), we assume that the established rm chooses its scope n before its output. At the stage 0 of the game, the big rm's prot function is as follows:
which can be shown to be strictly increasing, concave and once continuously dierentiable (see Figure 3 for an illustration).
Insert Figure 3 here
Building on the spatial model of exible manufacturing (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994) and following Mayer et al. (2014) who use linear-quadratic preferences, we assume that the big rm has a baseline variety at k = 0, which corresponds to its core competency. To supply another variety, the rm must incur an additional cost that increases with the distance to its baseline variety. For simplicity, we assume that the development cost of variety k is given by c(k) = tk with t > 0. When the big rm's scope is n, the total cost is therefore equal to tn 2 . However, our results remain qualitatively the same for more general specications of the development cost c(k). 3
Maximizing Π * (n) − tn 2 with respect to n and using Proposition 1 yields the following result.
3 Our conclusions are unaected when we account for scope economies by assuming that total costs are given by F + tn 2 where F > 0 is the cost of launching a R&D division.
Proposition 2. Assume core competencies with c(k) = tk. (i) Entry is blockaded if and only if:
(ii) Entry is deterred if and only if:
(iii) Entry is accommodated if and only if:
Hence, we get the following intuitive conditions: the big rm accommodates entry, hence the dilution of market power holds, when moving away from core competency is costly, the market is large, and/or the preference for diversity is strong. In the remaining sections, we will focus on the regime of accommodated entry.
The dilution of market power under single-aggregate preferences
It is tempting to argue that the dilution of market power is an artefact of linear-quadratic preferences. In this section, we show that this property survives under a much more general condition, i.e. rms' inverse demand depends only on the rm's output and a scalar that aggregates the decisions made by all rms (Pollak, 1972) . Consider N ≥ 1 big rms, with rm j = 1, .., N supplying each a mass n j > 0 of varieties and producing at marginal cost C j > 0. We discuss below the case where large rms can freely enter the market.
The small rms are heterogeneous in the sense of Melitz (2003) . Prior to entry the small rms face uncertainty about their marginal cost but know the continuous distribution Γ(c) from which the marginal cost c is drawn. To enter the market, the small rms must bear a sunk cost f e . After entry, each rm observes its marginal cost c. In addition, an active c-type rm must incur a xed production cost f , so that producing the quantity x c involves a cost equal to f + cx c .
Consider preferences such that rms face single-aggregate inverse demands p(·, Λ) where Λ is a scalar market aggregate which accounts for all the cross-eects within the demand system (examples are given below).
4 In this case, rms' prot functions may be written as follows:
wherec is the cuto cost.
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Assumption SA. The inverse demands are single-aggregate and given by p(·, Λ) where the value of Λ is unaected by the action of a single small rm. These demands are such that rms' prots (15) and (16) are continuous, strictly quasi-concave in their own strategy for all admissible Λ, and strictly monotone in the aggregate Λ for all admissible X jk and x c . 6
The strict quasi-concavity assumption is made for the best reply to be a well-dened function. That π c strictly decreases (increases) with Λ means that the market aggregate Λ is a substitute (complement) of
Assumption SA is satised by the linear demand system (3) where Λ = X. Other examples of demand systems that are widely used in industrial organization and international trade are given below.
1. Additive preferences. Consider the inverse demands derived from additive preferences (e.g. the CES and CARA):
where u and U j are strictly increasing and concave, with u(0) = U j (0) = 0, while M e is the mass of entrants.
Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, the utility-maximizing conditions yield the following inverse demand functions:
In this case, the market aggregate, which is the marginal utility of income, is pinned down by the budget constraint:
4 Pollak (1972) shows that Marshallian demands are single-aggregate if and only if the inverse demands satisfy the same property. 5 To avoid complex issues raised by income endogeneity which stems from redistribution of prots, we assume that rms are owned by absentee shareholders. Therefore, since labor is the numéraire, we have y = 1.
6 Unlike Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Anderson et al. (2015), we do not assume the aggregator Λ to be additively separable in rms' strategies.
Clearly, Λ is unaected by a change in x c or in X jk . 7 2. Homothetic demand systems with a single aggregator. Another example is given by the homothetic demand systems with a single aggregator (HSA) studied by Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017).
The HSA inverse demands are given by
where φ(·) and Φ j (·) are decreasing functions whose elasticities do not exceed one in absolute value. The market aggregate Λ is implicitly dened by the solution to the following xed-point condition:
which stems from combining (17) with the budget constraint.
The class of HSA preferences includes both the CES and the translog. The former is obtained by choosing power functions with the same exponent for φ(·) and Φ j (·). The latter is a special case of (17) where φ(·) and Φ j (·) are such that
where γ and γ j , j = 1, ..., N , are positive parameters.
3. Indirectly additive preferences. A further example of single-aggregate demand systems may be obtained from indirectly additive preferences, that is, the indirect utility is as follows (recall that y = 1):
where v(·) and V j (·) are decreasing, convex, and twice dierentiable. The corresponding inverse demand system is given by
where the market aggregate Λ is given by the solution to the budget constraint: 7 Since Λ is the only variable that accounts for income, the properties derived below hold true when the individual income is made endogeneous through the redistribution of the big rms' prots.
In sum, the Assumption SA is satised for a broad class of preferences.
Consider the second stage of the sequential game in which the big rms move rst and the small ones second. Being negligible to the market, each small rm accurately treats the market aggregate Λ as a parameter and determines its best reply function x * (Λ). This function is well dened under Assumption SA. This assumption and the envelope theorem imply that the optimal prot function π * c (Λ) is monotone in Λ. Therefore, for any given Λ, the cuto condition
has at most one solutionc(Λ), which is also monotone in Λ. More specically,c(Λ) increases (decreases) with Λ if and only if π * c (Λ) increases (decreases) with Λ. Hence, the zero-prot conditionc
has a unique solution Λ * . In other words, as long as entry is accommodated, the equilibrium value Λ * of the market aggregate is uniquely determined and independent of the actions chosen by the big rms.
In the rst stage of the game, the big rms anticipate the equilibrium value Λ * . Hence, each big rm j chooses the quantity X * jk of its variety k that maximizes its prots [p(X jk , Λ * ) − C j ] X jk , which depend only upon X jk .
Consequently, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume a hybrid market structure with big and small rms. Under Assumption SA, the big rms behave like the small rms.
This result has several important implications.
Being non-strategic is a rational strategy. A hybrid market functions as if all rms were to operate under monopolistic competition. Stated dierently, the small rms incentivize the big rms to refrain from reducing their output, which renders these rms more aggressive. Furthermore, since the big and small rms are heterogeneous, they do not sell at the same prices. However, under Assumption SA, they adopt the same pricing rule. In short, Proposition 2 shows that the dilution of market power holds true for a much broader class of preferences than the linear-quadratic utility.
The eects of idiosyncratic shocks. Consider the consequences of a small shock on the marginal cost C j of a large rm j. We have seen that the equilibrium value Λ * , the cuto cost c * , and the the small rms' pricing behavior are independent of C j . Furthermore, it is readily veried that, if entry is accommodated in equilibrium, then the behavior of the incumbents (other than j) does not depend on C j . Indeed, the rst-order condition of a large rm i = j is given by
for all k ∈ [0, n i ]. Since the prot function is strictly quasi-concave in every rm's own actions (Assumption AS), the prot-maximizing output X * ik of rm i's kth variety is uniquely determined by (19) . Moreover, X * ik depends solely on the equilibrium market aggregate Λ * and rm i's own marginal cost C i . Therefore, the equilibrium outputs X * ik and prices P * ik ≡ p(X * ik , Λ * ) of any large rm i = j are independent on C j .
In sum, when the market structure is hybrid, idiosyncratic shocks to large rms do not trigger aggregate shocks on these rms; they aect the mass M * e of entrants that shrinks or expands in response to the shock.
However, a change in the cost distribution across small rms does generate aggregate shocks. Indeed, as seen from (18), a shift in Γ(·) changes the value of Λ * , which in turn aects the cuto c(Λ * ) and the pricing strategies of all rms.
Entry or merger is neutral. Assume that an additional big rm enters the market. If the market is still hybrid after entry, the big rms do not react because the value of Λ * is unaected. However, the fringe shrinks for Λ * to remain constant. In the same vein, when two or several big rms choose to merge, the other big rms do not react. In the limit, the number N * of large rms can be pinned down through dierent mechanisms, e.g. free entry. When N * is determined, the argument developed above still applies when the number of big rms is N * . In particular, the free entry of large rms need not deter the entry of small rms, and thus the dilution of market power may also hold under free entry of big rms.
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If a shock is not too strong, the market is stabilized by the entry and exit of small rms. By contrast, if the shock is suciently strong to trigger the disappearance of the fringe, the big rms adopt a strategic behavior and react to exogenous cost shocks, entry or merger.
The above neutrality eects concur with Redding and Weinstein (2017) who show empirically that supply-side distributional assumptions play a very limited role for understanding revealed comparative advantage across countries and sectors, while the demand-side is key.
8 See Norman and Thisse (1999) for an example in a spatial model of product dierentiation. 4 The dilution of market power under two aggregates So far we have discussed the case in which the inverse demand functions are single-aggregate. In the baseline model of Section 2, the aggregate is the total output, while under additive preferences, the aggregate is the marginal utility of income. These two aggregates capture dierent types of market interactions. Total output stems directly from demand linkages across varieties, but it disregards the impact of income. In contrast, the marginal utility of income captures the substitution eects channeled through the budget constraint, but it ignores how total consumption aects the utility derived from consuming a specic variety. Therefore, it seems natural to consider the more general case where both eects are at work, that is, demands are double-aggregate. In other words, rms' inverse demands involve two independent market aggregates. To achieve our goal, we go back to the quadratic utility of Section 2 but without an outside good.
Two aggregates and one fringe
Consider the basic setting of Section 2 where the utility is given by
Note the dierence with (1) that includes two goods. Because the dierentiated product is now the only consumption good, the marginal utility of income is endogenous and aects the demand for each variety.
The utility-maximizing conditions yield the following inverse demands for variety i ∈ [0, M ] and
which depend on the two aggregates X and λ. Note that λ and X have a dierent impact on demands: a lower λ rotates clockwise the demand schedules around the saturation point, whereas a lower X shifts the demand schedules upward by increasing the sole intercept. Thus, when both X and λ fall (rise), each rm faces a higher (lower) demand. Furthermore, λ is constant when preferences are quasi-linear, e.g. linearquadratic. The same holds in partial equilibrium models with an outside good. What renders λ variable here is that the budget constraint is binding.
The small rm i's prot is given by
Since the small rms treat the aggregates X and λ parametrically, their prot functions are strictly concave in x i . Of course, any equilibrium of the fringe features symmetry among small rms:
In the second stage, the large rm's total output X mp dened by (4) is treated parametrically by the small rms. A small rm's rst-order condition yields:
where λ * (X) is pinned down by the zero-prot condition:
This expression shows that the equilibrium value of the aggregate λ varies with the aggregate X:
the marginal utility of income decreases as the total consumption rises. Therefore, we must know X to determine λ.
Since marginal costs are zero, the labor market balance implies that the equilibrium mass of entrants is given by M * = 1/f > 0. Combining this with X = X mp + M * x * (X) and (21), we nd that the impact of the big rm on the market aggregate is described as follows: Figure 4 provides an illustration. Comparing Figures 1 and 4 shows why the big rm now aects the equilibrium value of X: there is no at spot in Figure 4 . As a result, the equilibrium of the second stage depends on the choice X mp made by the big rm in the rst stage. To put it dierently, the large rm always exploits its strategic power to manipulate the market outcome. This is to be contrasted with Proposition 1 where X * is independent of X mp when n is not too large.
Insert Figure 4 about here
In the foregoing analysis, we implicitly assume that the monopolistically competitive fringe exists (x * > 0), which holds if and only if X mp < 1. Combining equation (23) with (21) and (22) yields the second-stage equilibrium: x * (X mp ), p * (X mp ) and λ * (X mp ). By studying the rst stage, it is possible to determine the condition on the size n of the big rm for this inequality to be satised.
Two aggregates and two fringes
rm's behavior.
10 Put dierently, when both monopolistically competitive fringes are active, the market equilibrium exhibits the dilution of market power, even though preferences are no longer single aggregate.
But does a market outcome with two active fringes exist? We show in Appendix that, if β is not too high, while the values of the supply-side parameters satisfy
then there exists a threshold value n > 0 such that both fringes are active if and only if n < n. This result agrees with what we have seen in Proposition 1: the dilution of market power holds true when the big rm is not too big.
Two aggregates: a summary
We summarize the main ndings of this section in the following proposition. In the foregoing, we have chosen to work with quadratic preferences because this allows us to highlight the role played by two market aggregates. However, it should be clear that the dilution of market power keeps its relevance under other preferences generating double-aggregate demand systems such as the Kimball's (1995) exible aggregator (Matsuyama and Ushchev, 2017) . The key factor is the relationship between the number of aggregates and the number of monopolistically competitive fringes.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we distinguish between two kinds of rms, i.e. multi-product rms and single-product rms.
The former can a priori manipulate the market whereas the latter cannot because they are negligible. Our results are best illustrated by our new version of the dominant rm model. Depending upon its scope, a dominant rm can either accommodate a monopolistically competitive fringe, or deter entry, or behave like an unconstrained monopolist. The novel case arises when entry is accommodated while rms' prots depends on a single aggregate such as the total output or the marginal utility of income. In this case, we 10 To guarantee that X * > 0, we must assume that β is too large:
have shown that this aggregate is determined by the sole entry and exit of small rms. Therefore, even when the dominant rm has a relatively large market share, this rm nds it prot-maximizing to disregard its ability to manipulate the market, practicing instead a divisionalization strategy akin to monopolistic competition. More generally, we have seen that the presence of a monopolistically competitive fringe may vastly aect the behavior of large rms in that the former disciplines the latter.
Our results suggest that consumers' preferences, more than producers' costs, determine the market structure, implying that the on-going emphasis put on cost heterogeneity could well be exaggerated. This is also in line with the recent empirical ndings of Hottman et al. (2016) and Redding and Weinstein (2017) . In short, our framework allows the market structure to be endogenized by determining conditions for oligopolistic competition, monopolistic competition, or hybrid forms of competition to emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
